

EXHIBIT NO. 117A

SECRET

Initials: C. G.

Date: 17 Feb. 1941

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 17, 1941.

In reply refer to: AG 354.2/JAX

Subject: Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Division,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

1. In a recent confidential letter of instructions to commanders of the six major echelons of the United States Fleet, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, expressed the pressing necessity for maximum readiness in the Hawaiian area, particularly for Pearl Harbor defense, of all available aviation components. I am in agreement with Admiral Kimmel in his belief that much remains to be done for adequate future effectiveness in this respect, but that much can now be done with means now available, to make arrangements for local employment of aviation more effective than they now are.

2. With above in mind and under provisions contained in Joint Control Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and 14th Naval District, 14 April 1939, joint planning representatives have been selected from echelons concerned in order that detailed plans and recommendations may be undertaken. Upon completion, plans and recommendations will have been formulated to implement the following;

a. Joint Air Exercises. Desirability of intensified attention to this subject. Frequency and scope. Degree of coordination. Improvement along practical lines.

b. Communications. Fully satisfactory communications between all Army and Navy air activities, both in the air and on the ground. Direct and instantaneous communication, in particular, between all Army and Navy air fields. Continuation of and renewed stress upon Joint communication exercises.

c. Air Command. Determination of responsibility and degree under various conditions. Arrangements between the two services for such direct exercise of air control as may be necessary.

d. Landing Fields, Mutual Use. "Scattering" plans, including dispersion of patrol planes. Familiarization of Navy and Army aircraft personnel with one another's landing fields and facilities, including actual practice in mutual use and servicing.

[2] *e. Aircraft Recognition and Familiarization.* Recognition signals between air and ground. Familiarization of all personnel—air, ground, and ship—with all local Navy and Army types.

f. Alert Watches. Determination of suitable alert watch conditions. Requirements for all naval aircraft types. Size and composition of watches. Watches with and without ship-based planes present. Conservation of personnel and material.

g. Armament and Re-armament. Plans for adequate accomplishment with means now available. Ready storage. Speed. Replenishment.

h. Alarm and Detection. Effective and instantaneous air alarm arrangements. Detection by RADAR (and otherwise) and tracking of enemy planes. Possible restriction of own planes to specific operating areas for this purpose. Similarly, control of air traffic approaches.

i. Employment of balloon barrages, smoke and other special devices for improving defenses of Pearl Harbor.

j. High priority to increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and establishment of air warning net.

k. Effective coordination of Naval and Military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

l. Joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

m. Joint exercises, at least once weekly, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces on Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids.

3. In the joint planning enumerated herein it is directed that all echelons or individuals concerned render every possible aid and cooperative assistance to the end that maximum needs for Army-Navy joint action may be met.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

EXHIBIT NO. 118

[1] Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.
1200, 30 November, 1941.

Memorandum for the Commander in Chief.

STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF AMERICAN-JAPANESE WAR WITHIN THE NEXT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS

1. Despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.

2. Despatch to Task Force Commanders:

(a) WPL #0 effective.

(b) Sweeping plan cancelled.

(c) Commandifier and staff in company with him (Task Force 5) carry out present mission. Upon completion cover WAKE against enemy operations until joined by Task Force Three. Remainder of Task Force Two (now at sea in operating areas, return to PEARL HARBOR.

(d) Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows: Cancel cruiser operations west of NANPO SHOTO; delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Battle One join Task Force One; Task Force Three with units of Task Force Two present in PEARL HARBOR depart and rendezvous with Commandifier at Point "A" at; Commander Base Force send two tankers to Point "A" with utmost dispatch, report expected time of their arrival.

(e) Send one Marine Bombing Squadron to MIDWAY.

[2] 3. (a) I would not modify the movements of the WRIGHT now enroute WAKE to MIDWAY, nor REDULIN, enroute PEARL to MIDWAY, nor ship bound to CHRISTMAS and CANTON.

(b) I would continue WILLIAM WARD BURROWS to WAKE, directing Commandifier (Com Task Force 5) to have two destroyers join her as escort.

(c) I would not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.

(d) I would provide two destroyers to escort SARATOGA from longitude 150° west to PEARL HARBOR. (Under present set up, Commander Task Force Three has been directed to furnish this escort from his force which would be at sea on arrival of SARATOGA. Under the plan of paragraph 2 above, this order should be transferred to Com Task Force One. This note added by Good).

(e) I would not direct any change in passage of shipping to and from MANILA, nor would I send any added escorts, nor disperse any cruisers toward CALIFORNIA or SAMOA until further developments occur.

[1] Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.
1200, December 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the Commander in Chief.

RECOMMENDED STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF AMERICAN-JAPANESE WAR WITHIN THE NEXT FORTY-EIGHT HOURS

1. Send despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.

2. Send despatch to Task Force Commanders:

(a) WPL #0 effective. (Execute O-1A B5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below. (The SS and VP plans will become effective without special reference to them).

(b) Commence sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nanpo Shoto, cancelled.